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Introd ucatio n
Why is the world divide d into rich and poor nation s?

Most radica l critic s

of the intern ationa l economic order would argue that there is some
fundam ental
unequ alizing proces s at work.

The argum ent that there is an inhere nt tenden cy

for intern ationa l inequ ality to increa se is often referr ed to as
the doctri ne
of "uneve n develo pment ." This doctri ne is usuall y associ ated with
marxi sts
such as Baran (1951) , Frank (1967) , and Walle rstein (1974) , but
simila r argwn ents
have also been made by nonma rxists such as Myrda l (1957) and Lewis
(1977) .
This paper sets out a model which attemp ts to presen t the essen
tials of the
doctri ne of uneven develo pment in schem atic form. The model portra
ys a two
region world in which the indus trial sector s of region s grow throug
h the ac
cumul ation of capita l. Given one crucia l assum ption- -that there
are extern al
econom ies in the indus trial secto r-a small "head start" for one
region will
cumul ate over time, with export s of manuf acture s from the leadin
g region crowd 
ing out the indus trial sector of the laggin g region . This proces
s, I would
argue, captur es the essenc e of the argum ent that trade with develo
ped nation s
preven ts indus trializ ation in less-d evelop ed count ries.
·· In additi on to helpin g synthe size and clarif y the argum ents of
theor ists of
uneven develo pment , the model set forth in this paper is of some
techn ical
intere st. Conve ntiona l trade theory has often been critic ized
for being static
and for assum ing consta nt return s to scale.

The model develo ped here meets

these objec tions, while contin uing to make use of the tools of
orthod ox theory .
One of the surpri sing things that emerge s from the analys is is
that the marxi st theor)
of uneven develo pment fits in very well with the Hecks cher-O hlin
theory of trade.
The paper is organi zed in four sectio ns.
of the model .

Sectio n 1 lays out the struct ure

The basic analys is of the model 's dynamics is carrie d out in

This paper was stimul ated by discus sions with Lance Taylo r.
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Section 2.

Section 3 considers the role of internation al investment, and

shows that the model naturally gives use to a two-stage pattern of develop
ment which bears a striking resemblance to Lenin's theory of imperialism . Fi
nally, Section 4 extends the analysis to a thre-region world.
1.

The Basic Model
Consider a world consisting of two regions, North and South.

These

regions will be assumed to be identical in the sense that technologic al and
behavioral relationshi ps are the same.

To sharpen the analysis, I will also

assume that the regions have equal labor forces, and that these labor forces
do not grow over time.

Thus we have

Each region will be able to produce two goods, a manufacture d good
and an agricultura l product

M

A, and to trade at zero transportat ion costs.

There will thus be a single world price of manufacture d goods in terms of
agricultura l products,

PM.

Agricultura l products will be produced by labor

alone; we will choose units so that one unit of labor produces one unit of
agricultura l goods.
The growth sector, however, is manufacturi ng.
quire both capital and labor.

Manufacturi ng will re

It will be assumed that, from the point of

view of an individual firm, the unit capital and labor requirement s are fix
ed .1/

In the aggregate, however, unit capital and labor requirement s will not

be constant; instead, in each region they will be decreasing functions of the
region's aggregate capital stock.

Letting

cN, cs, vN, v 8

be the unit capi

tal and labor requirement s in North and South respectivel y, we have
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C

C

where

N

s

(2)

a:

•

c', v' <O.

I will, however, assume that the absolute value of the

elasticity of unit input requirements with respect to output is less than one,
so that total input requirements rise as manufacturing output rises.
Since the assumption of external economies in the industrial sector
is crucial to the dynamic story we are about to tell, it requires some dis
cussion.

There are really two questions here.

be justified in microeconomic terms?

First, can external economies

Second, does the concept of external

economies really capture the processes theorists of uneven development have
in mind?
The justifications for technological externalities have, of course,
been familiar since Marshall.

Even. if economies of scale are internal to

firms, internal economies in the production of intermediate inputs can behave
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like external economies for the firms which buy them.
legitimate to make use of the concept.

So it is certainly

'What may be questioned is whether ex

ternal economies are empirically important or, if they are, whether they are
more important in manufacturi ng than in agriculture .

For the sake of argument

this paper will assume that there are important external economies specific
to the industrial sector.
From a doctrinal point of view it also seems reasonable to use external
economies

as a key element in a theory of uneven development .

Some theorists

of uneven development , such as Baran (1957), have explicitly stressed the role
of external economies.

More generally, the essential argument in any theory

of an unequalizin g spiral must be that a region with already developed indus
try has an advantage in industrial production over a region without, and it

.

2/

.

is hard to see how to model this except in terms of external economies. -

While many authors have also argued for other factors, such as a distorting
effect of the interaction with developed countries on demand in less-develo ped
countries, external economies seems to be a useful minimal assumption.
Given the relationship s (2), then, together with full employment of
factors, we can determine the pattern of output.

In each country the output

of manufacture d goods depends on the capital stock:
(3)

Output of agricultura l goods can then be determined from the agricul
tural sector's role as a residual claimant on labor:
(4)

-5Note that there is an upper limit,

K

max

to the amount of capital

which can usefully be employed in either region, which comes when the region
is completely specialized in manufacturing and no more labor can be drawn out
of a.gricul ture.

We can define

K

max

by noting that

Consider next the distribution of income.

v(K

max

) •K

max

/c(K

max

There are two cases:

) • L.
the

case in which at least some labor is used in agricultural production, and the
case of complete specialization in manufacturing.

If some labor is used in

agriculture, this ties down the wage rate, which is 1 in terms of agricultural
goods,

1/PM in terms of manufactures.

unit of capital as a residual.

We can then determine the rental per

For simplicity, let us assume (though it is

not essential) that capital goods are produced by labor alone, i.e., we include
them as part of "agricultural" output.

Then the rental per unit of capital,

measured in agricultural (or wage) units, is also the profit rate, and we

have

(5)

where

PN,Ps

are profit rates North and South.

Since

c and v

are functions

of the capital stocks, we can also write (5) as a pair of reduced form equations
(6)

where

op/aPM and

ap/oK are both positive.

When a region is completely specialized in manufacturing, (6) no long
er holds.

Instead the rate of profit is determined in Kaldorian fashion by

the requirement that savings equal zero, if there is no foreign investment,
or by the rate of profit on foreign investment if there is such investment.
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In the latter case the wage rate is residually determined.
To close the 100del we need to specify the demand side.

I will make

two strong assumptions for the sake of easy algebra; the conclusions of the
First,

100del could be derived under weaker but less convenient assumptions.
saving behavior is classical:
a fixed proportion

µ

all profits and only profits are saved.

of wages will be spent on manufactures,

1-µ

Second,

on agri

cultural goods.
The savings assumption means that, if there is no international invest
ment, the rate of growth of the capital stock in each region will just equal
the rate of profit

KiKN

= PN

i./K5

=

(7)

Ps

It is easy to see how this can give rise to an unequalizing spiral.
Suppose we are at any early stage in the development of the world economy
where both regions are nonspecialized, but North has accumulated more capital
than South.

Then since the regions will face a common relative price of manu

factures, by (6) the rate of profit and the rate of growth will be larger in
the region which already has more capital.

This is the basis for the diver

gence analyzed in more detail below.
The relative price of manufactured goods will be determined by world
demand and supply.

Since a fraction

µ

of wages is spent on manufactures,

provided that both countries produce some agricultural goods we have
(8)

which can be rewritten as
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This gives us a relationship between the two capital stocks and
it is apparent that
that

~

and

Ks

PM

is decreasing in both capital stocks.

enter symmetrically, so that where

PM;

Note also

~ • KS , apMl aKN •

aPM/aKS.

Finally, we can combine (6), (7), and (9) to express the rate of change
each region's capital stock as a function of the levels of both capital stocks:
(10)

We know that the effect of an increase in the other region's capital
stock must be to turn the terms of trade against manufactures and thus reduce
profits; so g
2

<

O.

The effect of an increase in the domestic capital stock

is, however, ambiguous, since there are two effects:

a worsening of the terms

of trade and a reduction in unit input requirements.

I will assume that the

first effect outweighs the second:
are relatively weak.

g

< O. In other words, external economies
1
It is apparent that this is a conservative assumption

which weakens the forces for uneven development.

Nonetheless, divergence will

still occur.
We have now set out a complete dynamic model in which the evolution
of the two regions' industrial sectors can be followed from any initial position.
The next step is to trace out and interpret the path of the world economy
over time.

2.

Dynamics of Uneven Development
The basic process which drives this model is extremely simple.

As long

as both countries produce agricultural goods, wage rates will be equalized by
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trade; while because of the externa l econ9mi es in manufac turing product ion,
whichev er country has the larger capital stock will have a higher profit r~te
and will therefor e grow faster.

The result is an ever-inc reasing divergen ce

between the regions, which ends only when a boundary of some kind has been
reached .

The outcome can differ slightly , dependin g on what sort of boundary

limits the process .
Figure 1 illustra tes the essentia l point, which is that no "interio r"
equilibr ium--wh ere both regions produce both manufac tured and agricul tural
goods-c an be stabl~.
pN • O,

Ps •

The lines

(A formal proof is given in the appendi x).

0 indicate combina tions of~ and KS for which profits in North

and South respecti vely are zero.
lines are downwa rd-slopin g.

Given the assumpt ions in Section 1, these

Also drawn in is a schedule

along which the

relative price of manufac tures is constan t, the dotted line TT.

As we move

northwe st along TT, the profit rate must rise in North and fall in South, be
cause of the externa l economi es in manufac turing.

As a result, the line PN = 0

is less steep.
If we now recall that each region's capital stock will grow if profits
are positive , shrink if they are negativ e, it is apparen t that the behavio r
of the system near the interior equilibr ium must be as indicate d by the arrows.
There is a knife-ed ge path leading to the equilibr ium; but if either region
starts with even a slightly larger stock of capital , there will be an ever
increasi ng divergen ce in that directio n.
The divergen ce will continue until a boundary is reached .

In this

model boundar ies are defined by the impossi bility of having a negative capital
stock, and by the fact that when a region's stock of capital reaches Kmax , prof
its drop to zero and growth ceases.

Figure 2 illustra tes the boundar ies and
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p
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1 One possibi lity is indicate d by~. E~.

the interest ing possible outcome s.1

In each of these equilib ria, the "underde veloped" region has speciali zed com
pletely in agricul ture, while the "develop ed" region contains both agric
ultural and industr ial sectors.

At~ or E~, by contras t, both regions special 

ize, the develope d in manufac tures and the underdev eloped in agricult ure. Fi3
3
nally, at EN or E the boundary is given by the exhausti on of investme nt op5

portuni ties in the develope d region.
,

The capital stock in the develope d region

.

is Kmax , which implies that the region speciali zes in manufac tured goods; mean
while the underdev eloped region develops some manufac turing capacity , but continues to produce and export agricul tural product s.
Although these three cases differ slightly , they all involve a long run
equilibr ium in which the world has become differen tiated into industr ial and
non-ind ustrial (or at least less-ind ustrial) regions.

It would run against the

spirit of the doctrine of uneven developm ent, however , to conduct the analysis
solely in terms of long-run solution s.
dynamic story.

Instead we should consider the whole

Figure 3 illustra tes how uneven developm ent occurs, for the

case in which both regions end by speciali zing.

We start from an initial pos

ition such as A or B, in which one region has slightly more capital.

There

then follows a period in which both regions grow, but the already more devel
oped region grows faster.

As manufac turing capital grows, the relative price

of industr ial goods falls, until eventua lly a point is reached when the lagging
region's industry cannot compete and begins to shrink.

Once this starts, there

is no check, because costs rise as the scale of the industry falls; and the
lagging region~ s manufac turing sector disappe ars.
This is of course precisel y what is supposed to have happened to the
Indian textile industry in the eighteen th century .

In effect the lagging region's
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nascent industrial sector is destroyed by manufactured exports from the lead
ing region, which is, according to Baran, what "extinguished the igniting
spark without which there could be no industrial expansion in the new under
developed countries. n!:./
There are a number of interesting aspects of this story.

Although the

character of the long-run equilibrium is determined by tastes and technology,
which region takes on which role depends on initial positions, i.e., on "prim
itive accwnulation."

Whether one prefers to explain the greater initial ac

cumulation of capital in one region by the slave trade or the Protestant ethic,
this is a model in which small beginnings can have large consequences.
interesting aspect is the role played by trade.

Another

The divergence of capital

stocks depends on the proposition that, as long as both countries are non
specialized, trade in goods leads to equalization of wage rates, i.e., of a
factor price.

There is thus a surprising affinity between the marxist theory

of uneven development and the Heckscher-Ohlin -Samuelson model of trade.
3.

Inter~ational Investment
So far we have assumed that industrial growth must come from capital

accumulation out of domestically earned profits.

In this final section I

will open up the model to allow international investment.

The easiest way to

do this is by making the extreme assumption that capital moves instantly so as
to equalize profit rates in the two regions.
Again, we will be interested in the dynamic behavior of the world
economy.

In particular, we want to know if a Leninist view of the process

can be justified.
stage process:

Lenin saw the evolution of the capitalist system as a two

''Under the old type of capitalism, when free competition pre

vailed, the export of goods was the most typical feature.

Under modern cap

italism, when monopolies prevail, the export of capital has become the typi
cal feature. 1151

In this model, it turns out that Lenin's "stages" can occur,

though this is only a possible outcome.
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The working of the model under the assumption of perfect capital mo
bility is quite straightforward . and rests on one basic principle:
not possible for both regions to be unspecialized.

that it is

For if both regions are

unspecialized. their wage rates will be equalized by trade in agricultural
products.

The profit rate will then be higher in, whichever region has the larg

er stock of capital. and capital will flow to that region.

In particular, if

the world capital stock is less than Kmax , neither region can specialize in
manufactures, and the initial position will necessarily be a point on one of
the axes of our diagram.
What happens next depends on the particular characteristics of tech
nology and demand, which determine how far industrializati on goes. If the
1
1
long-run equilibrium looks like EN' ES in Figure 1, a declining relative price
of manufactured goods will drive profits to zero and halt capital accumulation
even before the leading region is completely industrialized.
corresponding to

2
f.ip

Another possibility.

2
ES• is that accumulation continues until the developed

region is completely industrialized, but that by that time PM has fallen too far
to allow profitable investment in the underdeveloped region.
Finally. if the long-run equilibrium is one in which both regions be
come at least partially industrialized. we have the Leninist case illustrated
in Figure 4.

There are two stages of capital accumulation.

In the first stage.

from A to B, the rate of profit is sustained and growth able to contine through
increasing exports of manufactures to the underdeveloped region.

When~ reaches

, this process cannot continue.
K
max

The reserve army of labor in North's

agricultural sector is exhausted;!/

the wage rate rises, and the profit rate

falls sufficiently to induce capital to flow to the other retion.

This inaugu

rates a second stage of accumulation-" imperialism, the highest stage of capital
ism"-which depends on capital export from North to South, and is shown as the
movement from B to ,C.
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In addition to this shift in the mechanism of growth, the move from
the first to the second stage of accumulation in this Leninist variant of the
model also brings about an important change in the world distribution of in
come.

There are three relevant groups:

and capitalists.

workers in North, workers in South,

As long as we are in the first stage of accumulation, where

the industrial region is not yet fully industrialized, the availability of
labor from North's agricultural sector keeps wages equal in the two regions.
In the "imperialist" stage, however, it is now profits which are equalized,
by capital flows.

Since industry is more efficient in the industrial region,

Northern wages are now higher than Southern:
a "labor aristocracy."

the Northern workforce becomes

This might mean that in addition to exporting capital,

the industrial region might, in the second stage of growth, begin importing
labor--a point also noted both by Hobson and by Lenin.
4.

A Three-Region World
This final section considers an important extension of the analysis,

to a world of three regions.

Adding a region allows us to consider the possi

bility that the trend of international inequality may at some times be am
biguous, with a middle-income region growing faster than either high or low
income regions.
Let us suppose, then, that there are three regions:
periphery, and Periphery, with capital stocks Kc, K5 , 1),•

Center, Semi
These

regions

will, like the two regions of Section 1, have identical tastes and tech
nology.

There will be assumed to be perfect mobility of capital between

the regions.

Finally, we will assume that Center has an initially larger

stock of capital.
The dynamics of the three-region world economy are illustrated in
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Figure 5.

As before, there is a maximum stock of capital which can usefully

be accumulated in any one region, thus defining the boundaries of a cube with
a side of K
•
max

At the same time, only one region

amre

unspecialized at any

given time; for if two regions were unspecialized, they would have equal wage
rates and capital would flow to the region with the larger capital stock.

Thus

capital will initially accumulate in only one region, as shown by the movement
from A to B.

If it is still profitable, industrialization will then spread to

one of the other regions, as shown by the move from B to

c.

This second stage of capital accumulation is interesting in several ways.
For one thing, which poor region becomes industrialized at this stage is ar
bitrary, and can be determined by historical accident or by small differences
in the conditions of production between the two backward regions.

Another in

teresting point is the direction of international capital movements, which go
from the high-income region to the middle-income region, not to the poorest
areas.

Finally, notice that during this stage of world growth there simul

taneously is a narrowing of the differential between the middle-income and the
high-income regions, and a widening of the differential between the middle
income and low-income regions.
It would clearly be possible, by refining the assumptions of this
model, to give it a much more realisitic feel.

What is remarkable, though,

is how much of what has been said about uneven development can be illustrated
by an extremely simple model.

This suggests that it may be fruitful, and use

ful to both sides, to apply the tools of orthodox economics to some of the
ideals of the economic system's radical critics.

-18-

-

--

-

- - - -A
I I

I

I
I

I

I
I

I

;_

I

I

I

I

J

I

____

I

- - - -{

I

I

KS

I

I
I

I

\

I

I

I
I

Bi

->

➔➔➔

.;),-

._
C

KC

Figu re 5

11

FOOTNOTES
1.

The fixed-coefficient assumption is made for analytical simplicity, not be
cause it plays any central role.

There is noth~ng in this paper fundamental

ly opposed to capital-labor substitution, or to the theory of marginal pro
ductivity.
2.

There is a fairly extensive literature on static trade models with exte'rnal
economies.

3.

For a discussion and bibliography, see Chacholiades (1978).

There are also some other possibilities.
ior equilibria, all of them unstable.
with

~ -=

KS • O and with

~

First, there may be several inter

There can also be stable equilibria

• K5 • Kmax·

is from Baran, cited'by Sutcliffe (1972).

4.

The quotation

5.

Lenin (1939), chapter 4.

6.

Actually, this does not quite accord with Lenin, who argued that industrial
countries still had a backward agricultural sector.

Naturally the stylized

model of this paper cannot do justice either to the richness or to the in
ternal contradictions of Lenin's work.
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Appen dix:

Insta bility of inter ior equil ibria

rnal" equil ib
In Secti on 2 of the paper it was stated that no "inte
could be stabl e.
rium, i.e., one with both count ries unspe cializ ed,

This

appen dix provi des a forma l demo nstrat ion.
Begin by combi ning (6) with (7); then we have
(Al)

ibrium where
from which it is imme diatel y appar ent that at any equil

•

KS • 0

*

Next consi der (4), which we can write

KN • KS • K •

we must have

in the shorth and form
(A2)

As noted in the text, if

•with

Now solve for

•

~
•

KS

-

Ks

~,

pl +

1

,r

P2

~ -=

KS, ,rl

and linea rize aroun d

*
~ -K

1:
,r

P2

=

1
,r 2 .. ,r •

*
K:
(A3)

K*
1
,r P2

pl+

1
,r

P2

KS -K*

of the matri x in
An equil ibrium will be unsta ble if eithe r the trace
1
,r P 2 >0, the
+
Pl
if
But
ive.
negat
is
inant
determ
the
or
ive
W) is posit
1
is negat ive. 'J.bus
trace is posit ive; while if pl + ,r p 2<0, the determ inant
any inter ior equil ibrium is unsta ble.

